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REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO A DISPROPORTIONATELY ASSESSED
TAXPAYER IN NEW YORK STATE
By

ALBERT

K. HILL*

Probably the most ancient of the many problems found in the taxation
system of New York State is that of disproportionate assessment for purposes of
the general property tax. Clouds gathered on the horizon early in 17791 and
the skies have loomed ever darker and more forbidding over subsequent state
legislatures. 2 In 1949 the lawmakers again sought a solution and appointed a
temporary state board of equalization and assessment to ferret out the difficulties
and, if possible, determine their resolution.3 After five years, the results of
intensive investigation and study were published in the form of new equalization
rates for the taxing units of the state.

The legislature has concerned itself primarily with that inequality which
exists within a larger taxing unit when property on the roll of one taxing district
is assessed at a larger percentage of full value than property on other rolls. This
problem is closely related to that which occurs when the property of one taxpayer
on an assessment roll is valued at a higher percentage of true value than that of
other persons on the same roll . . . disproportionate assessment.
What happens when a taxpayer finds that his assessment is at a rate unequal
to that of his fellow taxpayers? Must he bear an unequal share of the tax burden,
or may he take measures to secure equality? This study is directed to these
questions.
Member of the New York Bar.
1. L. 1779, c. 16. This act empowered county boards of supervisors to
appoint three of their number to superintend the raising of the property tax.
These supervisors were authorized to examine the assessment rolls and to
recommit them for further consideration by the local assessors if valuations
were too high or too low.
2. 1 Stat. 589 (1798) provided authority for equalization of assessments
by the Commissioners of the direct tax. By L. 1799, c. 72, the New York Legislature directed the use of such valuations for the state property tax. Rev.
Laws c. 611, §4 (VanNess & Woodworth 1813), gave county boards of supervisors some equalization powers. Strongly worded attacks on exisiting inequalities were contained in messages by several governors of the state. See Governor's Message, 1843, p. 24; Governor's Message, 1859, p. 41; Governor's Message, 1860, p. 175. In 1859 the first state board of equalization was created. L.
1859, c. 312. Subsequent legislation has involved many aspects of the problem.
3. L. 1949, c. 343, as extended by L. 1952, c. 293 and L. 1954, c. 150. ValidIty of this act was upheld under an attack that it violated the state constitutional prohibition against creation of new deparments of government in Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. Moore, 277 App. Div. 245, 98 N. Y. S. 2d
973 (3d Dep't 1950), appeal granted, 277 App. Div. 954, 99 N. Y. S. 2d 615 (3d
Dep't 1950).
*
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I.

ASSESSMENT PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES AVAILABLE
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THOSE PROCEDURES

Any consideration of taxpayers' remedies necessarily involves a preliminary
investigation of the method by which the taxes in question are levied or assessed.
New York State has not levied a general property tax since 1928, so the taxes
under discussion here are those by counties and smaller governmental units upon
real estate within their boundaries. Personal property is specifically excluded
4
from the general property tax.
A. The Assessing Process5
By far the greater bulk of property is valued by local assesors, but the Tax
Law provides for the assessment of so-called "special franchises" by the State Tax
Commissiony
1. Property in General
The local assessors are directed to ascertai' annually the full value of all
taxable property within their jurisdiction. Corpo~hte holdings are also included
in this assessment.9 This is so even where the realty assessed comprises part of a
single parcel extending beyond the limits of one tax district. Such a situation
-presents many difficulties, and since there is no provision for valuation and
apportionment of values by a central agency, it would appear that assessment must
necessarily be made upon a reproduction-cost-less-depreciation or appraised basis,
rather than on one of capitalized earnings. It is an obvious fallacy to attempt to
4. N. Y. TAX LAw §3.
5. The dates set forth below may vary depending upon the municipality
involved. Under section 11(1) of the City Home Rule Law a city has the power
to enact local laws relating to: the preparation, confirmation and correction
of local assessments for taxation purposes; the review of such procedures subject to the further review by the courts; and the levy, collection and administration of city taxes. See City of New Rochelle v. Seacord, 30 N. Y. S. 2d 240
(1941). Most if not all of the cities of the State have adopted periods differing
from those set forth in the Tax Law.
In following local laws, caution should be observed to make certain that
subsequent amendments of the Tax Law have not superceded the local provisions, as was the case in Bapps Corporationv. City of Buffalo, 279 App. DIv.
263, 109 N. Y. S. 2d 369 (4th Dep't 1951), aff'd 304 N. Y. 766, 108 N. E. 2d 677
(1952).
6. N. Y. TAX LAw §20.

7. N. Y. TAx LAw §45. This function has been temporarily transferred to

the state board of equalization and assessment. See note 3 supra.
8. N. Y. TAX LAw §§8, 20.

9. N. Y. TAX LAW §11, providing, "The real estate of all Incorporated com-

panies liable to taxation shall be assessed in the tax district In which the same
shall lie, in the same manner as the real estate of individuals."
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evaluate, on a capitalized earnings basis, portions of parcels of realty held by an
integrated enterprise.
The Tax Law stipulates that assessments are to be at full value as of June
first each year.10 A roll is to be prepared listing the assessed value of the land and
the total assessment upon a form prescribed by the State Tax Commission."
Upon completion of this list on or before June twenty-fourth, a copy is to be
made available for public inspection until the second Tuesday in July.'2 On that
date the assessors will hear and determine all complaints about assessments
brought before them.' 3 At the conclusion of these hearings, the assessors revise
4
the roll in accordance with their decisions and place their oath upon it.1
The
5
completed rolls must again be opened for public inspection.' Delivery of the
various local rolls to the clerk of the board of supervisors follows. Preparatory to
the levy of taxes, the supervisors are to "examine the assessment rolls ... for the
purpose of ascertaining whether the valuations in one tax district bear a just
relation to the valuations in all the tax districts in the county.16 Aggregate valuations of real estate in any tax district may be increased or diminished in accordance
with a mathematical formula elaborated in the Tax Law.' 7 The board lacks any
power to change individual assessments, and even in equalizing assessments within
the county may not disturb the aggregate valuation of realty listed on the
assessment rolls.
Although the supervisors may correct manifest clerical errors on the rolls' 8
they may not add omitted property without due notice to the affected taxpayer.19
10. N. Y. TAx LAW §§8, 9.
11. N. Y. TAx LAw §21. The commission is also empowered to issue Instructions and promulgate regulations to govern local assessing procedures;
N. Y. TAx LAw §§21(7), 171.
12. N. Y. TAx LAw §25. Due notice of the completion and of the times and
place where the roll may be inspected by the public must be given.
13. N. Y. TAx LAw §27. N. Y. TAX LAw §31 mandates the county board of
supervisors to exercise the duties and powers of the assessors in relation to
the hearing of complaints which the assessors fail to hear.
14. N. Y. TAx LAw §28.
15. N. Y. TAx LAw §29. City rolls are to be in the hands of the city
clerk by August first, and there held for at least fifteen days for public inspection. In a township, the town clerk is to receive a certified copy of the
roll by August fifteenth and hold it for examination until October first, when
It Is delivered to the town supervisor.
16. N. Y. TAX LAW §50.
17. Ibid. A five step method is prescribed: (1) after inquiry and investigation, the equalization ratio for each tax district is to be determined; (2) the
full value of all property in each district is to be ascertained by utilization
of this rate; (3) the county ratio is determined by dividing the total full value
into the total assessed valuation; (4) the total full value in each tax district
Is multiplied by the county ratio; (5) assessed values in each district are to
be increased or diminished in the amount necessary to make them equal to
the figure determined in the fourth step. This formula Is used solely for the
purpose of apportioning the county tax burden.

18. N. Y. TAx LAW §56(1) (a).
19.

N. Y. TAx LAw §56(3).
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Such property, whether omitted in the current or preceeding year, may be added
to the current roll. If the omission occurred in the preceeding year, the property
20
is to be taxed at the rate of taxation imposed in that year.
The assessors themselves may add to the current rolls property omitted in
the preceding year. 2' The law makes no provision that in such circumstances the
property is taxed at the prior rate of taxation, and apparently such property
would be taxed at the same rate as all the other property on the roll.22 Faced
with what today appears as certain as taxes themselves, a rising tax rate, the
omission of property in one year by the assessors, with its subsequent addition
to the tax rolls of the succeeding year, may well produce a tax "windfall" for the
municipality.
2. Special Franchises
A special franchise includes the value of the "tangible property . .. situated
23
in,upon, under or above any street, highway, public place or public waters.
However if the franchise is located outside the limits of an incorporated village
2 "1
or city and is less than 250 feet in length it is not considered a special franchise.
Properties included within this category are railroad tracks, bridges, gas and water
mains, telephone and power transmission lines, subway or street railway tracks,
gates and signals at grade crossings, and steam pipes. The right to erect these
structures on public domain is granted in a franchise from the state or local governmental unit. The prime holders of such franchises are utility corporations,
although a private person or business corporation exercising such a privilege also
falls within this classification. Although this grouping would not be considered
25
real estate by a lawyer, it is so treated for purposes of general property taxation.
The State Tax Commission annually fixes and determines the assessment of
each special franchise within the state subject to taxation. 20 In determining this
assessment the latest state equalization rate applies, with one important exception
-any portion of the special franchise assessed in the year 1953 shall have applied
27
thereto the 1953 equalization rate.
20. Ibid.
21. N. Y. TAx LAw §24.
22. Ibid. But see 0I
ps. State Compt. 44,(1945).
23. N. Y. TAx LAw §2(6).
24. N. Y. TAx LAw §2(7). This subsection does not apply to elevated railroads.
25. People ex rel. Met. St. By. Co. v. State Tax Comm'rs, 174 N. Y. 417,
67 N. E. 69 (1903), aff'd 199 U. S. 1 (1905). See also People ex rel. Jamica TV. S.
Co. v. State Tax Comm'rs, 196 N. Y. 39, 89 N. E. 581 (1909).
26. N. Y. TAx LAw §45.

27. Ibid.
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Complaints must be in writing and specify the objections to the valuation,
and must be served upon the Commission at least ten days before the date set for
28
the hearing.
Following the hearings, the Commission fixes and determines the final
value of each special franchise.29 Certified statements of the valuation of special
franchises are to be furnished the clerk of the local governmental unit where
such franchises are located not later than 30 days before the final completion,
verification and filing of the assessment roll.30 The valuation established by the
state agency are assessed valuations for the purpose of all taxes. 3 '
Prior to the amendment of the Tax Law in 195332 the procedure was somewhat different. Full value was first determined, then the equilization rate figured
and multiplied by full value to yield final equalized value.33 By freezing equalizamay have created
tion rates on special franchises assessed in 195334 the legislature
35
a distinct economic advantage for new business enterprise.
B. Direct Attack Upon Assessments.
Main street on the route to challenging successfully any assessment for tax
purposes is an appeal to the officials who are responsible for the alleged erroneous
assessment.
1. Property Valuted by Local Assessors.
The first opportunity afforded a taxpayer desiring to challenge an assessment
upon his property is "grievance day."36 At this time a verified complaint speci28. N. Y. TAX
29.

LAW

§45-a.

N. Y. TAx LAw §45-b.

SO. N. Y. TAx LAW §45-c. Within five days after receipt by the clerk, that
official is directed to deliver a copy of the statement to the assessors, who
must enter such valuation on the assessment roll before final revision and
certification.
31. N. Y. TAX LAw §45-e.
32. L
33. N. Y. TAx LAW §45 as repealed by L. 1953, c. 874, §2.
34. See note 26, supra.
35. Assume a corporation has a special franchise which has a full valuation of $100,000. If this franchise were assessed in 1953 in a city then having
an equalization rate of 95 percent, the assessed value in that year, and all
subsequent years (ignoring for purposes of illustration the probable decrease

in valuation due to depreciation) would be $95,000. The equalization rate for
1956 in the same city is 65 percent. A franchise acquired subsequent to 1953

and not taxed in that year, though it had a value of $100,000, would be car-

ried on the rolls at $65,000. Thus, two identical franchises, of equal value,
might be carried on the tax rolls at greatly differing values. Possibly the
apparently discriminatory aspects of the law may lead to early retirement.of
some special franchises and their replacement by new ones.
36. See note 13, supra.
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Lying the grounds of objection should be filed with the board of assessors.37
Technical shortcomings may be cured if objection is raised at the hearings.
Apparently if objection is not taken, these defects will be deemed waived. 8
In the course of hearing and determing complaints, the assessors may receive
testimony, administer oaths, hear proofs and require the complainant to appear
personally and testify.39 No formal record of these proceedings is kept but a
transcript of the minutes of the testimony of every person must be filed with the
town or city clerk. When the assessors make their decision upon the complaint
presented to them, an individual taxpayer's remedies are terminated as far as
administrative review is concerned. To preserve other remedies available under
the statutes of New York, the taxpayer should fully utilize the administrative
appeal open to him.4°
2. Special Franchise Assessments.
A challenge to a special franchise assessment follows the general pattern of
grievance day protests under section twenty-seven of the Tax Law. Again, a
written complaint specifying the objections is the basis for the challenge. 41 The
Commission is to hear and determine not only complaints by the holders of
special franchises, but also those by a city, town or village with regard to valuations
it has established. 42 After determination of final values, a notice thereof must be
sent to each franchise holder and to the governmental unit wherein the property
is located. This notice is important since the time of its serving determines when
43
judicial proceedings to review the assessment must be instituted.
3. DisproportionBetween Tax Districts.
Consideration of a taxpayer's remedies when he is disproportionately
assessed requires mention of state equalization rates and their method of establishment. Such rates are necessarily determined for use in computing state aid to
37. N. Y. TAX LAW §27.
38. People ex rel. New York Cent. R. 1?. v. State Tax Comn'n, 292 N. Y.
130, 54 N. E. 2d 332 (1944), rehearing denied 292 N. Y. 717, 56 N. E. 2d 122
(1944). On a tax law certiorari to review a special franchise assessment, the
petition failed to specify the alleged illegality, and the Court of Appeals held
that failure of the Tax Commission to make a timely challenge waived the
defect. This principle should apply on grievance day before local assessors as
well, inasmuch as the proceedings there are of a much less formal and less
technical nature.
39. N. Y. TAx LAw §27. Willful refusal or failure to appear or to answer
a material question will bar a taxpayer from any relief.
40. N. Y. TAX LAW §290-c requires application for relief to the proper
administrative officials as a prerequisite to institution of judicial proceedings

to review an assessment.
41.
42.
43.

N. Y. TAX LAw §45-a.
]bid.
N. Y. TAX LAW §46.
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various local governments, and more importantly, to fix debt and tax limitations
44
created by the State Commission or statute.
By an amendment to Article V, Section 1 of the State Constitution, adopted
on November 8, 1955, the powers and duties of the State Tax Commission
connected with or pertaining to assessment and taxation may be transferred to
the State Comptroller by the Legislature. Accordingly, when the Legislature
exercises such power, references herein to the Commission may in reality refer
to the Comptroller exercising such new powers and duties.
It is the duty of the Commission to examine the assessment rolls of each
city, town and village in the state to determine the percentage of full value at
which taxable realty on the rolls of such unit is assessed. A final equalization rate
45
shall be established for each such city, town and village.
A tentative equalization rate is first adopted, and notice of the same given
to the taxing unit involved. Such notice must state the time and place when
complaints about the rate will be heard. Any complaints must be in writing and
must be served, either personally or by mail, at least five days prior to the hearing
date.4 It would appear that where an equalization rate is changed without
notice and opportunity for a hearing, no objection need be filed with the Com47
mission to prepare the way for successful challenge to that action in the courts.

Following the required hearings, the Commission determines and adopts a
final rate of equalization.4 8 Notification of this determination is then given to
the clerk of the city, town or village affected. 49 To prevent equalization rates
from becoming antiquated and out of step with the times, as has long been the
case, the Tax Law provides that the ratio of assessments to market values shall
be sampled at least once every five years in all tax units of the state.50
Where a taxpayer's grievance is not individual but one he suffers in common
with the other property owners in his taxing district, he may obtain further
administrative relief. If the complaint is based on disproportion between tax
districts, a request for equalization might be made to the county board of
44. For an interesting example of one of the problems created by the

revision of equalization rates, see Hill v. Board of Education of Central School
Dist. No. 2, 286 App. Div. 332, 143 N. Y. S. 2d 415 (3d Dep't 1955), affld 309
N. Y. 945, 132 N. E. 2d 315 (1955).
45. N. Y. TAx LAw §49-a.
46. N. Y. TAX LAW §49-b.
47. People ex rel. Cornwall Telephone Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 128 Misc.
474, 219, N. Y. Supp. 647 (1926).
48. N. Y. TAx LAW §49-c.
49. N. Y. TAx LAW §49-d.
50. N. Y. TAx LAw §49-f.
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supervisors. 51 Should this action prove ineffective, recourse to section 175 of the
Tax Law is possible. This section provides a special remedy for a tax unit claiming
that it has been aggrieved by an inequitable equalization ratio established by the
supervisors. The main hurdle in the utilization of this procedure appears to be
that the petition can be brought only by a tax unit, and approval of the action
2
by the legislative body of the district is prerequisite to initiating the appeal.5
Again, a political obstacle must be overcome before the remedy can be successfully employed. The scarcity of cases involving this procedure may serve to
3
illustrate the inherent difflculties
Even absent political sanction, an individual taxpayer may press a case of
unjust equalization before the Tax Commission by seeking review of the equalization made by the supervisors.54 No approval of any political body is required.
Upon such an appeal or review the Commission may make such deductions from
or additions to the aggregate corrected value of the real property of any tax district
in the county as it determines proper. 55 No recourse to the courts is provided
from such a decision, and apparently the administrative determination is final.
Should the Commission's ruling be tested in the courts, its findings of fact should
be binding as long as supported by sufficient evidence.50
The statute specifically provides that the reasonable expenses of an appeal,
including counsel fees of not more than two thousands dollars, shall be certified
by the Commission and shall be a charge against the unsuccessful tax unit. 7 No
mention is made of costs before the Tax Commission upon a review, and since the
proceeding is before an administrative agency costs could not be assessed against
the losing party following the review procedure.
A proceeding under Tax Law Section 173-a is also available to an individual
taxpayer, as well as to a taxing unit. Under this provision the Tax Commission,
acting on information given by a taxpayer or otherwise, may get a show cause
51. Such a request would be political in nature and no provision for the

same is made in the statutes. The resultant equalization would be made In
accordance with the formula of Tax Law see. 50 described in note 17, supra.
52. N. Y. TAx LAW §175.
53. See People ex reZ. County of Saratoga v. State Tax Oomm'n, 276 N. Y.
529, 12 N. E. 2d 460 (1937), mem. affirming, 251 App. Div. 915, 297 N. Y. Supp.
260 (3d Dep't 1937); People ex rel. Town of Bedford v. State Tax Comm'n,
268 N. Y. 524, 198 N. E. 386 (1935), mem. affirming, 243 App. DIv. 656, 277
N. Y. Supp. 749 (3d Dep't 1935).
54. N. Y. TAX LAW §176-a. This provision was utilized by the mayor of the
City of Buffalo and the supervisor of the Town of Tonawanda In Rawe v.
State Board of Equalization, 1 A. D. 2d 29, 147 N. Y. S. 2d 297 (3d Dep't 1955).
55. N. Y. TAx LAw §177.
56. People ex rel. Town of Bedford v. State Tax Comm'rs, 243 App. DIv.
656, 277 N. Y. Supp. 749 (3d Dep't 1935), aff'd mem. 268 N. Y. 524, 198 N. E.
386 (1935).
57. N. Y. TAx LAw §178.
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order for a reassessment.58 If the Commission's contentions of inequalities or
underevaluations is accepted by the court, the local assessors must make a complete
reassessment. Possible disruption of tax administration may cause the Commission
to proceed warily in these matters, but the proceeding has been utilized in the
59
past.

II. ATTACK UPON THE ASSESSMENT IN THE NEW YORK COURTS
The exhaustion of administrative remedies is usually a condition precedent
to utilization of judicial remedies. This is so in the case of a tax assessment.8 0
61
But, as with almost every general rule, this one has its engrafted exceptions.
A.

The Statutory Procedure (Proceeding to Review Tax Assessment)

Judicial review of tax assessments has long been an available remedy in
New York. Prior to 1880, a taxpayer could utilize the common law writ of
certiorari to gain such review. However, this writ was discretionary and could be
utilized only in the correction of a tax assessed illegally and without jurisdiction.
It could not be applied to an erroneous or unequal assessment. 62 In 1880 the
common law writ of certiorari was abolished and a statutory writ created.6 3 By
this action the statutory writ was made available to challenge disproportionate as
well as illegal and erroneous assessments.
The provisions of the act of 1880 were carried over in the Tax Law id 1909,
where they remained substantially unchanged for forty years. In 1949 the
58. The order may be obtained from any justice of the Supreme Court
in the judicial district within which the tax district is located. See N. Y. TAX
LAW §173-a.
59. Matter of Lynch, 242 App. Div. 878, 274 N. Y. Supp. 894 (3d Dei't
1934).
60. Morewood Realty Holding Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 241 App. Div.
841, 271 N. Y. Supp. 392 (2d Dep't 1934), affd mem. 265 N. Y. 520, 193 N. E.
301 (1934).
61. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. City of New York, 276 N. Y. 198, 206, 11
N. E. 2d 728, 731 (1937). "It is equally well settled that if they (the taxing
officials-ed.) act entirely without jurisdiction in making an assessment their
act may be enjoined by a court of equity. In such a case, the rule against clolateral attack does not apply." See also National Bank of Chemung v. City
of Elmira, 53 N. Y. 49 (1873). Reasons for the distinction between illegal and
erroneous taxes are suggested in McLean v. Jephson, 123 N. Y. 142, 25 N. E.
409 (1890).
62. Cf. Weaver v. Devendorf, 3 Denio 117, 47 How. Prac. Rep. 465, 16
Abb. Prac. Rep., N. S. 71 (1846). Under this common law writ, judicial review
was confined solely to questions of the jurisdiction of the inferior body.
63. L. 1880, c. 269, later incorporated in N. Y. TAX LAw 290-c and remaining in substance in that law today.
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statutory writ was abolished and a proceeding to review a tax assessment replaced
it. Thus the Tax Law was brought into conformity with the Civil Practice Act,
wherein the writ of certiorari was abolished in 1937.05
The ostensible purpose of this change was to preserve the substantive rights
which certiorari served to safeguard, but at the same time to cast off the procedural technicalities which accompanied the old proceeding. 0 The Judicial
Council leveled the brunt of its attack at the anomaly whereby a person had to
67
petition for a writ which the court could not deny.
A proceeding to review a tax assessment for alleged disproportion in valuations may be initiated by a taxpayer under Tax Law section 290. The owner of a
special franchise may maintain the same sort of proceeding under Tax Law
section 46. Within thirty days after the completion and filing of the assessment
roll 68 an application for relief must be brought at a special term of the supreme
court in the judicial district in which the offending assessment was made. 9
Notice of an application for review, returnable in not less than twenty nor more
than ninety days, must be served upon the assessing officials, 70 coupled with
"... a petition duly verified setting forth that the assessment is
illegal, specifying the grounds of the alleged illegality, or if erroneous by
reason of overvaluation, stating the extent of such overvaluation, or if
unequal in that the assessment has been made at a higher proportionate
valuation that the assessment of other property on the same roll by the
same officers, specifying the instances in which such inequality exists, and
the extent thereof, and stating that he is or will be injured thereby.
Such petition must show that application has been made in due time to
the proper officers to correct such assessment."7 '
64.
65.

L. 1949, c. 551.
L. 1937, c. 526.
66. 15 N. Y. JUDICIAL COUNCIL ANNUAL REPORT 77-80, 317-350 (1949).
67. Ibid. p. 78, "This includes the anachronism of requiring an aggrieved
taxpayer to petition the court for a writ which the court cannot deny If the
petition complies with the statutory requirements. In this respect the issuance
of the tax certiorari writ is not within the discretion of the court, and the
writ serves no function, since the court does not pass upon the sufficiency of
the petition at that time." The Council considered its own previous suggestion
that all special proceedings might be converted into actions (Fourteenth Ann.
Rep., Legislative Document (1948) No. 18, pp. 49-51, 175-208; Third Ann. Rep.,
Legislative Document (1937) No. 48, pp. 133-170) and said that because of
distinctions between the two procedures, such as a hearing de novo, further
study was required before any definite recommendation could be made.
68. This will be after the second Tuesday in July and before August
first (in a city) or August fifteenth (in a town). N. Y. TAx LAw §§25, 29. These
dates will vary from city to city. See note 5, supra.
69. N. Y. TAx LAw §290-a. Under see. 46 a taxpayer seeking to challenge
a special franchise assessment must institute the proceeding not less than
thirty nor more than sixty days after the written notice of final value required
by sec. 45-d is served.
70. N. Y. TAx LAw §290-b. But see note 5, supra.
71. N. Y. Tax Law §290-c (italics added).
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Clearly the statute seems to compel any taxpayer to exhaust the remedies
available to him on grievance day. Despite this, the New York courts have held
that application to administrative officials was not a prerequisite to judicial
72
remedies where the assessing officials lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter.
In such a case the assessors have erroneously determined jurisdictional facts
essential to any actions under authority of law. Such authority of law is also
lacking where the statute is unconstitutional, and accordingly the New York courts
do not require exhaustion in such a case.
Exhaustion has been demanded however in cases where part of the assessment
was admittedly valid. A case in point is that of the taxpayer who claimed that he
had been illegally taxed on buildings which were allegedly exempted by a special
ordinance. In its decision against the taxpayer the court, denying relief in equity,
noted the distinction between illegal and erroneous taxes.1 3 Since the assessors
admittedly have jurisdiction where disproportion is the ground of attack, the
aggrieved taxpayer's initial petition appears relegated to those officials who placed
the valuation upon his property.
If grievance day fails to settle the taxpayer's complaint, he may resort to the
statutory review. The proceeding is usually tried by a referee. The parties may
stipulate certain parcels of real estate, regardless of assessed value, to be offered
in evidence at the hearing.74 Should the parties fail to agree on these parcels, the
referee may make a selection from lists submitted by the adversaries.7 5 From these
lists the referee will choose an equal number for each side, to which the proofs
must be confined, except that evidence of actual sales within the tax district
during the year in question may also be introduced.
Valuations may be determined on the basis of reproduction cost less depreciation, 76 capitalized income or earnings,7 7 recent sales of the same or comparable
72. People ex reL. Erie Railroad v. State Tax Comm'n, 246 N. Y. 322, 158
N. E. 884 (1927); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. City of New York, 276 N. Y. 198,
11 N. E. 2d 728 (1937); McLean v. Jephson, 123 N. Y. 142, 25 N. E. 409 (1890).
73. Sikora Realty Corp. v. City of New York, 262 N. Y. 312, 186 N. E.
796 (1933). Among the many cases reaching similar results, see Young Women's
Christian Ass'n v. City of New York, 247 N. Y. 591, 161 N. E. 194 (1928), mem.
affirming 220 App. Div. 49, 220 N. Y. Supp. 365 (1st Dep't 1927); Elmhurst
Fire Co. v. City of New York, 213 N. Y. 87, 106 N. E. 920 (1914).
74. N. Y. TAX LAw §293.
75. Ibid.
76. See People ex rel. Manhattan, Inc. v. Sexton, 284 N. Y. 145, 29 N. E.
2d 654 (1940), motion to amend remittitur granted, 284 N. Y. 737, 31 N. E.
2d 204 (1940), to the effect that this is the maximum valuation which may
be placed upon property.
77. Earning capacity and actual income derived should be considered
in determining valuation. People ex rel. Lehigh Valley Ry. Co. v. Harris, 257
App. Div. 912, 12 N. Y. S. 2d 1011 (4th Dep't 1939), aff'4 2.81 IN. Y. 786, 24 N, E.
2d 476 (1939).
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property,78 and appraisals by experts.79 The referee must find the true value of
the property involved, and the applicable equalization rate. A procedure for determining the equalization figure was outlined in People ex rel Hagy v. Lewis80
and has been followed in subsequent cases. 8 ' Under this method the referee must
determine the full value of the parcels submitted in proof and of the property
which is the subject of the proceeding. The total assessed valuation of the
"samples" is divided by the total true valuation found by the referee. The resultant
equalization figure is applied to the value found for the taxpayer's property and
the value at which it should be assessed is thereby determined. The petitioner's
chances of success are reasonably good since it should be an easy matter for his
counsel to include on his list for submission to the referee parcels which are
undervalued.82 Should the taxing officials be fortunate enough to list only properties assessed at full value, there will still be some existent disparity, benefiting
the taxpayer. It should be noted that the taxing officials are not likely to produce,
nor would they wish to produce, evidence of any property which has been overvalued. Even if such instances exist, the officials are not going to reveal them in
view of the probability of arousing not only the taxpayers involved but the
general public to methods of valuation which do not meet the requirements of
78. People ex rel. HotelParamount Corp. v. Chambers, 298 N. Y. 372,
83 N. E. 2d 839 (1949), motion to amend remittitur denied, 298 N. Y. 919, 85
N. E. 2d 61 (1949); People ex rel. Beardsley v. Barber, 266 App. Dlv. 371, 43
N. Y. S. 2d 588 (3d Dep't 1943), aff'd 293 N. Y. 706, 56 N. E. 2d 587 (1944);
People ex rel. Four Park Ave. Corp. v. Lilly, 267 App. Div. 102, 44 N. Y. S.
2d 802 (1st Dep't 1943).
79. Cf. People ex tel. MacCracken v. Miller, 291 N. Y. 55, 50 N. E. 2d 542
(1943).
80. 280 N. Y. 184, 20 N. E. 2d 386 (1939).
81. People ex rel. Ten Broecek Apartments Corp. v. Kinnaw, 197 Misc. 362,
94 N. Y. S. 2d 36 (1949), rev'd 276 App. Div. 722, 97 N. Y. S. 2d 511 (3d Dep't
1950); People ex rel. Reynolds v. Kinnaw, 276 App. Div. 718, 97 N. Y. S. 2d
506 (3d Dep't 1950); People ex rel. Yarras v. Kinnaw, 277 App. Dlv. 815, 97
N. Y. S. 2d 510 (3d Dep't 1950), rev'd 303 N. Y. 224, 101 N. E. 2d 474 (1951).
In the last cited case the Court of Appeals held that the sampling provisions
of the Tax Law had the effect of limiting the proof which might be adduced
in a tax certiorari proceeding. Accordingly, extraneous evidence as to equalization figures of the state or the board of supervisors was ruled incompetent.
The referee and Special Term in all three of the above cited cases had adopted
the sampling method and applied the Hagy v. Lewis formula to determine the
applicable equalization ratio. The Appellate Division reversed on the basis
that proper weight had not been given to equalization ratios established by
the County board of supervisors and the State Tax Commission. Foster, P. J.
dissented, saying the court's decision would subvert the sampling method and
make the result turn not on the fact of equalization shown by the samples In-

troduced in evidence, but on what some agency determined to be the fact.

82. An interesting example of the success which may be gained by industrious counsel appears in an unreported decision in Graf Realty Corp. v. Town
and City of Dunkirk (Chatauqua County, Feb. 14, 1956). Evidence of sales
during the taxable year was utilized to prove an equalization ratio of 29
percent.
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the Tax Law. Even though this method may not do complete justice to either
83
side, it appears a practical necessity in the expedition of the judicial process.
In availing himself of the remedies of the Tax Law, the disproportionately
assessed taxpayer has yet another string to his bow. Where his claim is that the
equalization rate for property generally is less than ninety-five per cent, he may
serve a demand upon the assessors that they admit a certain equalization ratio.
If this demand is denied, the taxpayer is then entitled, in the court's discretion,
to costs for the added burden he incurred in proving the equalization ratio. To
bring himself within this provision, the claimant must prove a ratio not in excess
4
of the figure specified in his demand.8
The proceeding to review is a complete trial de novo of questions of fact.
The referee must make a report on the basis of the evidence presented before him.
The judge at special term may either approve this report or reject it and make
his own findings. An appeal as of right lies from this order to the Appellate
Division.8 5 Such action must be taken within thirty days after entry of the final
order.86 The Appellate Division may review both as to facts and law, and may
87
make its own findings of fact.
Most appeals are finally determined by the Appellate Division. However,
when that court's decision is dissented from, or the decision below is modified or
83. Final Rep. of the Joint Legislative Comm. on Assessing and Reviewing, Legislative Document (1943) No. 69 gives figures on the great numbers of
proceedings to review assessments brought every year, many remaining on
court calendars for as long as four years. In New York City there are some
12,000 such proceedings initiated annually, and unless they are speedily determined such a backlog might seriously impede justice.
N. Y. Tax Law section 292-b provides that where a proceeding is not brought
to trial within four years, it is to be deemed abandoned in the absence of a
stipulation of the parties or an order of the court upon good cause shown.
This provision does not apply to proceedings in the City of New York. Cahen v.
Boyland, 1 N. Y. 2d 8 .............
N. E. 2d ............
(1956). Whether or not this
amendment will serve to expedite the trial of such proceedings remains to
be seen.
84. N. Y. TAx LAW §292-a. Employment of this provision requires some
ingenuity and a thorough knowledge of the case by taxpayer's counsel. If the
specified percentage is very much in excess of the fact of the situation, in all
probability the assessors will accept the demand. But where the stipulated
figure closely approaches the true state of facts, taxpayer's counsel must be
fairly certain that his proofs of valuation of submitted parcels will be accepted.
The provisions of this section do not apply to a proceeding to review a special
franchise assessment.
85. N. Y. TAX LAW §295; N. Y. CIV. PRAc. AcT §631.
86. N. Y. CiV. PRAc. ACr §632.
87. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT §584. Cf. People ex rel. MacCracken v. Miller,
291 N. Y. 55, 61, 50 N. E. 2d 542, 544 (1943), to the effect that the Appellate
Division may not set aside a finding made at Special Term, ". . . unless it
appears that the court at Special Term has failed to give to conflicting evidence the relative weight which it should have and thus has arrived at a value
which is excessive or inadequate." (court's italics).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
reversed, review as of right may be had in the Court of Appeals.88 An appeal by
permission may be taken where the Appellate Division certifies a question of law
is involved which should be reviewed. Should this certification be denied the
Court of Appeals may grant the request.89 Sixty days is allowed within which to
perfect an appeal to the Court of Appeals.90
Normally, the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing only questions of
law, but if the Appellate Division has expressly or impliedly found new facts in
reversing or modifying, the Court of Appeals reviews facts as well as law.Y1 In
such a situation the relative weight of conflicting testimony must be appraised
and judgment rendered in accordance with the weight of the evidence.02
At one time there was some doubt as to whether a judicially determined
valuation in one year might not be res judicata in subsequent years. 3 When the
question was directly presented to the Court of Appeals in People ex rel. Hilton v.
Fahrenkopf it decided that assessments fixed values annually and therefore a
prior judicial determination of value was not binding in future assessments,
though the assessors were the same persons. Such an adjudication is evidence of
value, however, for the succeeding year.03
This is the remedy which the New York statutes have expressly provided for
a disproportionately assessed taxpayer. Whether any other remedies are available
will be discussed below.
B. Collateral Attack-Proceeding Against a Body or Officer.
A disproportionately assessed taxpayer might be anxious to avail himself of
the provisions of Artide 78 of the Civil Practice Act dealing with review of
88. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT §588(l).
89. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACr §589 (2), (3).
90. N. Y. CiV. PRAc. Acr §592 (1). This applies to appeals as of right.
Application for permission to appeal must be made during the term of the
Appellate Division in which the decision was made, or the next succeeding
term. N. Y. Civ. PRAC. Acr §592(2). If that application is denied, application
may be made to the Court of Appeals for the requisite permission within thirty
days. N. Y. Civ. PRAC. Acr §592(3).
91. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr §605.
92. Cf. People ex rel. MacCracken v. Miller, 291 N. Y. 55, 50 N. E. 2d
542 (1943).
93. See People ex rel. Eckerson v. Zundel, 157 N. Y. 513, 52 N. E. 570
(1899), where Special Term had held the prior determinations binding. The
Court of Appeals termed the assessment for each year a distinct proceeding, but
went on to note that the assessors were not the same parties in the separate

proceedings and said that a judgment against one set of assessors ought not to
be held binding on the action of other assessors who are subsequently elected.
94. 279 N. Y. 49, 17 N. E. 2d 765 (1938).

95. Ibid.
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determinations by a body or officer. Such a remedy might be sought because the
time limitations are more favorable to the taxpayer.9 6
Relief under this article was once termed a certiorari order, 7 but has gone
through the same evolution which occurred in the case of tax certiorari described
above. Procedure under both statutes is similar, and where the Tax Law is silent
as to any details of practice, the Civil Practice Act provisions have been held to
govern.98 Included in the coverage of this statute are the former special remedies
of mandamus and prohibition.99
A self-contained limitation may serve to effectively bar a disproportionately
assessed taxpayer from this relief.
"Except as otherwise expressly prescribed by statute, the procedure under this article shall not be available to review a determination
in any of the following cases: ...

4. Where it can be adequately reviewed by an appeal to a court
or to some other body or officer.:"'
Under this provision the courts have held a taxpayer not entitled to this relief
when the assessment complained of was merely erroneous, as distinguished from
2
illegal. Furthermore, this extraordinary remedy is discretionary with the court,
and even if it were decided that it need not be denied as a matter of law, where
the Tax Law remedy is available the proceeding would probably be dismissed.
Following the rule set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County,3 it would be possible to argue that
disproportionate assessment violated the Federal Constitution. 4 This might appear
to bring such a case within the recognized exceptions to the rules of exhaustion
and exclusiveness, but even where unconstitutionality is asserted there is a
tendency on the part of the courts to require exhaustion whenever the facts are
96. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr §1286 allows four months after the determination
becomes final and binding within which the proceeding may be initiated.
97. See notes 62, 64, supra.
98. People ex rel. American Sugar Refinging Co. v. Sexton, 274 N. Y.
304, 8 N. E. 2d 869 (1937); People ex rel. New York City Omnibus Co. v. Miller,
282 N. Y. 5, 24 N. E. 2d 722 (1939).
99. N. Y. Crv. PRAc. Acr §1283.
1.

N. Y. CIV. PRAc. AcT §1285.

2. City of New York v. Maltbie, 248 App. Div. 36, 289 N. Y. Supp. 558
(3d Dep't 1936).
3. 260 U. S. 441 (1923).
4. U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
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important to the decision. Here the' basic question is one of fact, and the courts
are likely to insist upon exhaustion of any administrative remedies before
assuming jurisdiction.
Unequal assessment does not violate the New York Constitution, the only
provision for equality being a mandate to the Legislature to provide for the
equalization of assessments.8 The remedies of the Tax Law adequately meet this
mandate. In light of this fact a New York court would, be inclined to hold that
the taxpayer be required to utilize the prescribed procedure for the protection
of his federal right. Failing that he would be precluded from relief.0
C.

CollateralAttack-Other Judicial Remedies.

Among the other actions a taxpayer might seek when he has been disproportionately assessed is on to remove a cloud on title, or for declaratory relief.
Several cases have held that an action to annul a tax as a cloud on title could not
be maintained where, concededly, there was jurisdiction to impose some tax.
These decisions give further weight to the principle that collateral attack is banned
where the tax was erroneous and not illegal. Possibly the traditional notions that
equity will not act where there is an adequate legal remedy, or where one has
slept on his rights, are the rationale for such holdings.
Although the supreme court has been given power to declare rights and
other legal relations in any action or proceeding,8 a disproportionately assessed
taxpayer's hopes to obtain such relief are slim. Initially a major stumbling block
is that the granting of such a declaratory judgment is discretionary with the court.0
The availability of another statutory remedy, however, neither controls the action
nor makes it impractical. 10
"An action for a declaratory judgment may be maintained, despite
the provisions of a taxing statute which provide that the method of
judicial review prescribed therein shall be exclusive, where the jurisdic5.

6.

N. Y. CONST. art. XVI, §2.

Possibilities of relief in the federal courts are considered infra.

7. Sikora Realty Corp. v. City of New York, 262 N. Y. 312, 186 N. E. 796
(1433); Young Women's Christian Ass'n v. City of New York, 247 N. Y. 591, 161
N. E. 194 (1928), mem. affirming 220 App. Div. 49, 220 N. Y. Supp. 365 (1st
Dep't 1927); Young Women's Christian Ass'n v. City of New York, 245 N. Y.
562, 157 N. E. 858 (1927), mom. affirming 217 App. Div. 406, 216 N. Y. Supp. 248
(1st Dep't 1926).
8. N. Y. Civ. PpAc. Acr §473.

9. N. Y. RuLEs Civ. PRAc. 212, "If, In the opinion of the court, the parties
should be left to relief by existing forms of actions, or for other reasons, It
may decline to pronounce a declaratory judgment, stating the grounds on
which its discretion is so exercised."
10. Richfield Oil Corp. of N. Y. v. City of Syracuse, 287 N. Y. 234, 39
N. E. 2d 219 (1942).
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tion of the taxing authorities is challenged on the ground that the statute
is unconstitutional or that the statute by its own terms does not apply
in a given case."11
The court pointed out that where the challenge was to the assessors' jurisdiction, not only was exclusiveness inapplicable,
"But where it is sought to set aside the assessment on other grounds,
then the12assessment may be reviewed only in the manner provided in the
statute."
The Court of Appeals has reversed denial of declaratory relief where discretion was exercised on the ground that there was an adequate remedy available by
virtue of a statute.13
Adhering to this decision, the Appellate Division has ruled that where the
taxpayer is admittedly subject to some tax under a statute or ordinance, it must
comply with the requirements of local law as to judicial review of the taxing
authorities' action. 14 The disproportionately assessed taxpayer does not challenge
his assessment in toto, but only that added valuation which makes him bear a
greater proportion of the tax burden than do other property owners in the
particular tax district.
Where an attack is based on disproportion alone, questions of fact and not
of law are presented to the court. The Court of Appeals has said that in a
situation where it appears that other than legal questions are involved, the parties
should be left to other remedies.' 5 In light of this decision, the rule of civil
practice providing for submission of questions of fact to a jury would be
employed apparently only where it was necessary to properly frame an issue of
law, and not where there was real dispute over an issue of fact.16
Declaratory relief as of right does not exist, and it is submitted that such a
remedy should be unavailable to attack inequality of assessment.
11. Id. at 239, 39 N. E. 2d at 221.
12. Ibid.
13. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. City of New York, 276 N. Y. 198, 11 N. E.
2d 728 (1937).
14. Children's Bus Service, Ite. v. City of New York, 272 App. Div. 1058,
74 N. Y. S. 2d 273 (2d Dep't 1947), mem. modifying 190 Misc. 161, 73 N. Y. S. 2d
232 (1947).
15. Seventy-Nine Delancy Corp. v. Meridian Holding Corp., 286 N. Y. 354,
36 N. E. 2d 619 (1941).
16. N. Y. RULES Civ. PRAc. 213. Such submission may be had upon direction
of the court.
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IIL Relief in the FederalCouTts
Although disproportionate assessment of itself may not violate any federal
right, where such undervaluation is intentional and the product of systematic and
arbitrary discrimination, the aggrieved taxpayer is denied the equal protection of
the laws." Assuming a New York taxpayer is able to prove the arbitrary aspects
of his overvaluation, may he by-pass the New York procedures for attacking the
assessment and resort directly to the federal courts?
In Hillsborough Township v. Cromwell'8 the Supreme Court of the United
States allowed a New Jersey taxpayer's suit for declaratory relief'0 in the federal
courts. Here the assessment was attacked on due process 20 and equal protection
grounds. The ultimate decision was on local law, and assumes its importance here
since the court held the act was not barred by the Johnson Act. That Act.
amended in 1948, provides:
"The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain,
speedy
' 21
and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State."
New Jersey's remedies were considered inadequate by the Supreme Court
and the Hillsborough case requires a comparison with New York procedures to
ascertain whether a like result might be reached in the latter state.
17. Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U. S. 441 (1923).
18. 326 U. S. 620 (1946). Forewarning of this result was given in Hackensack Water Co. v. Borough of Oradell, 17 F. Supp. 39 (D. C. N. J. 1936). A
taxpayer sought relief in equity, alleging its property was valued at true
worth while all other property in the tax district was assessed at fifty percent
of true value. The court denied a motion to strike the complaint, pointing
out that neither the assessor nor the county board could reduce the valuation
below true value. Moreover, nothing in the New Jersey statutes led to a
belief that an individual taxpayer could, as of right, institute any proceedings
to gain a reduction.
19. 62 STAT. 964 (1948), as amended, 68 STAT. 890, 28 U. S. C. A. §2201
(Supp. 1955); "In case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, except
with respect to Federal taxes, any court of the Dnited States, upon the filing
of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations
of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further
relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and
effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such." The
revisor's note states, "While this section does not exclude declaratory judgments with respect to State taxes, such suits will not ordinarily be entertained
in the courts of the United States where State law makes provision for payment under protest and recovery back or otherwise affords adequate remedy in
the State courts."
20. The county board had failed to comply with the statutory requirements of notice and hearing for the assessment of "omitted property". See
note 30, infra.
21. 62 STAT. 932 (1948), 28 U. S. C. §1341 (1950); (italics added).
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New Jersey provides for the assessment of property by local assessors, with
whom a taxpayer may confer informally in regard to his valuation. 22 Lists prepared
by these assessors are filed with the county board of taxation. Formal complaint
about an assessment must be made to the board, which
"... may,after investigation, revise, correct and equalize the assessed
value of all property inthe respective taxing districts, increase or decrease
the assessed value of any property not truly valued, add to the lists and
duplicates any property which has been omitted or overlooked, at its true
value, and in the general do everything necessary for the taxation of all
property in the county equally and at its true value."23
On appeal to it the board's powers are limited to raising the valuation on
property which has been underassessed, and do not extend to reducing the
assessment of a taxpayer who claims that he, and he alone, has been assessed
at full value. Royal Manufacturing Co. v. Board of Equalization of Taxes2 4 and
a number of other New Jersey decisions laid down the rule that a disproportionately assessed taxpayer had no right to have his assessment reduced. His
remedy was to petition for an increase of the other assessments 2 5 Although the
New Jersey statutes specifically limit the assessors to revisions not exceeding full
valuation, the New York law contains no such restriction, but apparently relies
upon the Constitutional mandate that property be assessed at full value.26
An appeal from the decision of the county board in New Jersey may be
taken to the division of tax appeals of the state department of taxation.27 If the
result of this appeal is unsatisfactory, the taxpayer may seek a certiorari writ for
review of his assessment.28 However, certiorari is discretionary and not available
as of right.20 Mr. Justice Douglas stressed the discretionary aspects of the New
Jersey writ in the Hillsborough opinion.
22. N. J. S. A. §54:4-38.
23. N. J. S. A. §54:4-47 (italics added) (repealed by L. 1948, c. 40, §18).
Probably this repealer would change the result of the Hillsborough case, but
the ensuing discussion is based on New Jersey law as it existed at the time of
that decision. Appeal to the board must be on or before August fifteenth.
N. J.S. A. §54:3-21. The board must keep a record of its judgments and hear
and determine all complaints by November fifteenth. N. J. S. A. §54:3-26.
24. 78 N. J. L. 337, 74 Atl. 525 (Ct. Err. & App. 1909).
25. This rule was reiterated in Lehigh Valley R. R. v. State Board, 12
N. J. Misc. 673, 174 Atl. 359 (Sup. Ct. 1934), where certiorari was denied to a

disproportionately assessed taxpayer.

26. N. Y. TAx LAW §27; N. Y. CONsT. art. 16, §2.
27. N. J. S. A. §54:2-35. A similar appeal may be taken on an "omitted
property" assessment. N. 3. S.A. §54:4-63.23.
28. N. J. S.A. §§2:81-1 to -12.1.
29. Staubach v. Cities Service Oil Co., 130 N. J.L. 157, 31 A. 2d 804 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1943), to the effect that the writ was discretionary and a refusal
to allow the writ was not subject to judicial review.
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New York does not provide an intermediate administrative appeal, but
allows the taxpayer to bring a proceeding to review the assessment in the courts
if the initial appeal is unsatisfactorily determined. Disproportionate assessment is
one of three specified bases for instituting such action.30 The New York remedy
is given as of right.31 It is broader than the federal right, for in the state a
taxpayer need only sustain his challenge with the fact of inequality, whereas the
federal right seems predicated on proof of systematic and intentional discrimination in undervaluation.
The New York remedy was considered adequate by a lower federal court.
Here the taxpayer had the right of judicial review by certiorari, was entitled to a
refund of the taxes with interest, might in some cases obtain a stay of collection of
32
the tax, and was also entitled to secure a declaratory judgment in the state courts.
New Jersey's remedies may be considered inadequate, but the rough similarity of the procedures available in New York should not result in a decision that
the relief there is not adequate. The New York statutes provide relief for the
disproportionately assessed taxpayer, and the right has become well established
through a long series of judicial decisions. The taxpayer need only prove that he
is assessed at a higher percentage of full valuation than other taxpayers in his
district, and he will be granted a reduction to the proven average level of the tax
unit. This reduction may be obtained either in administrative review, or upon
judicial review. Under such circumstances, it can hardly be maintained that equal
protection of the laws has been denied,
As in the Hillsborovgh case, due process objections33 might be made where
the assessors fail to comply with the notice and hearing requirements of the Tax
30. N. Y. TAX LAW §§ 46, 290-c.
31. See note 67, supra.
32. Collier Advertising Service, Inc. v. City of New York, 32 F. Supp. 870
(S. D. N. Y. 1940).
33. N. J. S. A. §§54:3-20, 54:4-63.12, 54:4-63.13 54:4-63.14 provide for
the addition to the tax lists of "omitted property" and "property omitted by the
assessor". As a condition precedent to assessing the former, the county board
of taxation must give a taxpayer five days notice in writing of the time and
place when hearings on objections to the proposed assessment will be held.
Failure to comply with the notice and hearing requirements was the "local
law" ground on which the federal district court invalidated the assessment
in the Hillsborough case. In Wyckoff v. Nunn, 39 N. J. L. 422 (Sup. Ct. 1877),
the court allowed certiorari as a proper remedy where the taxpayer had no
notice of the assessment and no opportunity to appeal to the commissioners of

appeal for relief. Where a taxpayer received an indefinite notice of a hearing
to assess its property, the court held jurisdiction lacking and allowed certiorari

to review denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Duke Power
Co. v. Essex County Board of Taxation, 122 N. J. L. 589, 7 A. 2d 409 (Sup. Ct.
1939), aff'd mem. 124 N. J. L. 41, 11 A. 2d 21 (Ct. Err. & App. 1939). An assess-

ment was set aside on certiorari for failure to comply with the statutory requirements for assessing "omitted property" in Duke Power Co. v. State Board
of Tax Appeals, 129 N. J. L. 449, 30 A. 2d 416 (Sup. Ct. 1939), aff'd per curiam,
131 N. J. L. 275, 36 A. 2d 201 (Ct. Err. & App. 1944).
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Law.3 4 Such defects would probably be held jurisdictional, 35 and in that event the
taxpayer would not be held limited to a proceeding to review an assessment under
the Tax Law, but could utilize several other methods of collateral attack.
Whether proceeding on equal protection or due process grounds, the New
York taxpayer will find a plain, speedy and efficient remedy in the state courts.
Thus the Johnson Act should serve to bar him from recourse to the federal courts
on these grounds.
IV.

Conclusion-OneAdequate Remedy

The New York taxpayer who seeks to challenge a property assessment.solely
on the basis of disproportion or inequality appears limited to a single remedy.
Considering the administrative and judicial processes as separate and distinct
entities, relief is actually two-fold.
Initially, application for relief is made to the local assessors on grievance
day. Exhaustion of this form of relief allows the taxpayer to invoke the aid of
the courts by a proceeding to review the assessment.
A declaratory judgment, an action to remove a cloud on title, and other
methods equitable in nature appear to be beyond his grasp. Relief in the federal
courts is speculative at best, and in all probability unavailable. Furthermore, the
New York procedure offers greater protection to the taxpayer than does the
federally guaranteed right of equal protection of the laws.
Despite this sole remedy, the taxpayer has no ground for complaint. His
right to institute the proceeding is well established. Upon judicial appeal, the
assessment is tried de novo. Liberalized practice governing evidence in this trial
allows the introduction of proof of sales of comparable property. The statutory
provisions for "sampling" reduce the amount of evidence which may be admitted,
with a corresponding reduction in costs of the suit to the taxpayer. In addition,
by proving an inequality of valuation among these samples, disproportion is also
proved. Inequality need not be shown for all the property situated and assessed in
thel tax district. The remedy is as speedy as any action in these days of crowded
34. N. Y. TAx LAW §§25-27, 29, 45-a, 45-b, 45-d.
35. See Second National Bank v. City of New York, 213 N. Y. 457, 107 N. E.
1039 (1915), where failure to give notice of completion and an opportunity to
be heard as required by law made the assessment void. The taxes were subsequently validated by the legislature, and a provision for hearing and a review
by certiorari was made. The taxpayer did not employ these provisions, but
sued to recover the amounts it had paid. Recovery was allowed as to all taxes
except those for one year on which the statute of limitations had run when

the action was initiated.
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court calendars, and judicial relief is not terminated at its initial stage but may be
prosecuted through the appellate level.
Though the taxpayer is limited to one remedy for his grievance, that remedy
seems completely adequate. It is one which will protect his rights and assure
him of bearing no more than his just proportion of the tax burden. True, the
time limitations for taking advantage of this review are short, but the taxpayer's
desire for more time must be balanced against governmental needs for revenue.
Necessarily something more than a mere rule of thumb must be provided by
which to gauge the amount of revenue which will be yielded in a given year.
In exchange for the protection afforded him New York insists upon a timely
assertion of those rights which are accorded the disproportionately assessed
taxpayer.
Although legally the proceeding to review is an adequate remedy, the author
is cognizant of the fact that for the small taxpayer who owns a residence of
average value the remedy may be financially unsatisfactory. Where disproportion
is involved, the taxpayer would require the services not only of an attorney but
also of a real estate expert to satisfactorily prosecute a proceeding to review. Such
services are not inexpensive, and in the average case would exceed the amount
of tax involved. The situation is not unlike that faced by many other persons
who have small claims, which must be prosecuted, if at all, in the courts. However,
the problem of the disproportionately assessed taxpayer might be more readily
solved than the problems of other such claimants. The solution lies in assessing
practices, and in the manner of selection of the local assessors. Action by the
legislature, though, is the only solution for such a taxpayer if he is to be provided
a remedy both legally and financially adequate.

